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A performance metric and goal-setting procedure is defined for an order fulfillment operation. In this operation, orderrequests arrive continuously, and filled orders are shipped at a specific time each day. The metric links the continu-
ous operation of order fulfillment to the scheduled shipment times. To prescribe goals against the metric, a performance
model is developed that incorporates the motivational effect of a goal. Goal-Setting Theory is used to establish the perfor-
mance goal and to show how to match arriving orders to deadlines based on their arrival times and expected processing
times. Monte Carlo simulation on data from a large distribution center is used to demonstrate that setting these two
parameters in the light of motivational research yields quite different results than doing so with an intuitive method.
Moreover, a motivational goal leads to better operational performance; that is, correctly setting up the metric causes more
customers to receive their orders sooner.
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1. Introduction
Order fulfillment is at the heart of a consumer-based
service economy. For retailers in particular, the ability
to respond quickly to customer orders can mean the
difference between delighted and disappointed cus-
tomers. Conceptually, order fulfillment is the straight-
forward process of picking products off of shelves,
putting them in boxes, and then loading them onto
trucks. The reality is much more complex: hundreds
of workers must coordinate their activities in ware-
houses as large as 1 million square feet to deliver
thousands of items to the shipping dock before the
trucks leave each day. Missing the truck departure by
just 5 minutes probably means a delay to the cus-
tomer of 24 hours.
This research is focused on improving customer
service in such operations by developing a metric and
goal-setting procedure that links the continuous pro-
cesses of picking and packing orders to the scheduled,
batch process of truck departures. The research is
motivated by the order fulfillment operations in a
large distribution center in California.
At this distribution center, orders arrive around the
clock, but shipments leave the facility only at speci-
fied times late in the day. Many shipments leave via
UPS or FedEx; others leave via less-than-truckload
carriers. Customers of this distributor expect short
response times to orders. Service performance at the
DC was internally assessed by average flow time, mea-
sured as the average elapsed time between an order
being received and being ready for shipment. The cor-
porate goal was to have this average be shorter than
24 hours. Unfortunately, using this internal measure
of flow time induced some unintended behavior. For
example, managers often invoked overtime on Friday
nights to clear orders for shipment, even though no
shipments were scheduled over the weekend. This
behavior was consistent with the goal of improving
performance by reducing average flow time, even
though it provided no benefit for the system (in fact, it
incurred additional costs).
An alternative metric for order fulfillment opera-
tions, which better aligns incentives with system level
performance, is Next Scheduled Deadline (NSD). NSD is
defined as the percentage of orders targeted for a par-
ticular deadline (truck departure) that are ready by
that deadline. Orders are targeted for particular dead-
lines through the use of a cutoff time: each deadline
having an associated cutoff time. Orders arriving
before the cutoff time are targeted for the associated
deadline.
NSD has several attractive attributes that compa-
nies should look for in an effective performance mea-
sure. First, for a given cutoff time, an increase in the
measure corresponds to a direct improvement in
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customer service—some customers receive their pack-
ages a day earlier than they otherwise would. Second,
the measure incorporates the non-continuous nature
of shipping and motivates workers to work at an
accelerated pace when it matters most—just before
the deadline. Third, the measure is meaningful
and easy to communicate to customers. This third
attribute allows the measure to be used both
internally and externally, albeit with different target
levels. (In this paper, only the internal measure is dis-
cussed.)
Using the NSD measure as part of a motivational
goal requires setting both the NSD percentage target
and the associated cutoff time. The goal of our
research was to examine how these two levers should
be set to improve customer service. This question is
examined by developing a performance model from
the tenets of Goal-Setting Theory, then using Monte
Carlo Simulation and a bootstrapping procedure to
evaluate potential solutions and set the two parame-
ters. The procedure is demonstrated with data from
the field site. The procedure is heuristic in that it does
not perform an exhaustive search of all possible
parameter settings (in particular, cutoff times are only
examined in one-hour increments), but a post hoc anal-
ysis is used to examine the quality of the solution.
Results show that using well-supported results
from Goal-Setting Theory leads to parameter settings
(an operational policy) that are different than they
otherwise would be. In particular, nominal targets are
set lower and cutoff times set later than an intuitive
process would suggest. Extrapolating from existing
goal-setting research findings, analysis of the field
data shows that 20.2% more orders would be placed
on the next shipment by setting parameters with the
procedure described in this paper, rather than an
intuitive procedure.
It is important to note that the procedure described
below uses existing results from Goal-Setting Theory
to build a prescriptive model for operational improve-
ment. That is, the data are not analyzed to support
(yet again) the results predicted by Goal-Setting The-
ory. Rather, the data are used to set an operational
policy, assuming that Goal-Setting Theory is correct
in its main predictions.
A review of the relevant literature in operations
management, performance measurement, and goal
setting follows in section 2. Section 3 introduces a par-
simonious performance model that incorporates
behavioral effects and also introduces a goal-setting
procedure. Section 4 applies the model to the field
data and demonstrates the superiority of the pro-
posed procedure to an intuitive one. The paper con-
cludes in section 5 with a discussion of managerial
implications, limitations, and ideas for future
research.
2. Literature Review
At least since the publication of Relevance Lost (John-
son and Kaplan 1987), there has been an acute aware-
ness of the sometimes dysfunctional connection
between performance measures and an organization’s
ability not only to assess but also to meet its tactical
and operational objectives. Recent performance mea-
surement research has increasingly focused on both
financial and non-financial measures, especially those
which help employees understand how their work
meets customer needs (Euske and Zander 2005). Met-
rics not only measure but also change organizational
performance. At times, performance measurement
systems encourage employee behavior that does not
advance operational objectives (Kerr 1975).
One of the primary gaps between the operations
perspective and the financial perspective has to do
with the impact and use of time (Neely and Austin
2002). There is a need for prospective or at least real-
time measures of performance vs. the traditionally
backward-looking historical financial measures.
There is also a need for the proper accounting of the
utilization of time itself, as time is connected with
both corporate strategy and customer satisfaction
(Stalk and Hout 1990). Managers increasingly incor-
porate operational metrics to ensure that performance
measurement encourages the right behavior, many of
which are deadline oriented, for example, “critical
team objectives like filling an order within 24 hours”
(Meyer 1998).
Motivation, of course, is not in the domain of
management accounting, but rather organizational
behavior. In reviewing the literature on motivation,
Goal-Setting Theory has a central place (Mitchell and
Daniels 2001). It is also an important area in which OB
research can inform operational models (Bendoly
et al. 2010, Boudreau et al. 2003). In Goal-Setting
Theory, the effect of a goal on performance is mediated
by motivation. That is, setting a goal only affects per-
formance through the impact it has on motivation. The
mechanisms of this mediation have been the subject
of considerable research and are fairly well under-
stood (Locke and Latham 1990). Goals, when accepted
(i.e., internalized), improve performance through
behaviors such as attention, effort, persistence, and
improved task strategies. Goals also encourage inno-
vation by encouraging the development of improved
strategies for accomplishing a task. Thus, there are
many ways that goal setting, through motivation, can
increase performance.
The basic finding that specific, difficult goals have a
positive impact on performance has been validated
numerous times through original work and several
meta-analyses (Johnson et al. 1981, Tubbs 1986, Wood
et al. 1987). The critics who do exist tend to be long on
Doerr and Gue: A Performance Metric and Goal-Setting Procedure for Deadline-Oriented Processes
Production and Operations Management 22(3), pp. 726–738, © 2012 Production and Operations Management Society 727
anecdote and short on data (Locke and Latham 2009).
The goal-setting effect is arguably the best-known
result from the last 25 years of organizational behav-
ior research into motivation. Nonetheless, the impact
of Goal-Setting Theory has not been felt in all areas of
work or academia, and its prescriptions are not neces-
sarily embedded in industrial systems. Moreover, to
some extent, operations management models may
have overlooked goal-setting prescriptions because
they are difficult to model and are not as precise and
simple as they seem at first glance.
This is not to say that the motivation and goal-set-
ting literature has been totally ignored by Operations
Management researchers. Within the domain of Social
Psychology, Bendoly et al. (2010) list motivation and
goal setting as a primary body of knowledge support-
ing the emerging field of Behavioral Operations. Hays
and Hill (2001, 2006) examined motivation as a medi-
ator between service guarantees and service quality.
Doerr et al. (1996) investigated the effect of group
goals vs. individual goals in push vs. pull production.
Linderman et al. (2003, 2006) observed the role of
goals in six-sigma process improvement teams and
found that difficult goals can sometimes be counter-
productive. Bendoly and Prietula (2008) looked at the
well-known interaction of training and goals (Mitchell
et al. 1994) and discovered further support for the
hypothesis that difficult goals can be counter-produc-
tive during skill acquisition. Still, these papers are the
exception to the rule: although goals are pervasive in
Operations, goal-setting research is rarely drawn
upon for support, and findings have rarely been
embedded in prescriptive models, as they are in this
paper. One exception to this is Yuen (2006), who
developed a prescriptive model of quality/quantity
trade-offs in white-collar workers given deadline-
based goals.
Again, the relative dearth of Operations Manage-
ment papers drawing on goal-setting research might
be explained by a great number of complications to
the seemingly simple idea that specific, difficult goals
should improve performance. Some of these compli-
cations are fundamental: for example, how “difficult”
should the goal be, and by how much will perfor-
mance improve? But the theory has also been
extended, and many moderators (factors that may
modify the basic relationship among goals, motiva-
tion, and performance) have been implicated. Some of
these have been researched quite deeply, like whether
participative goals work better than assigned goals,
but others have received relatively less attention. For
example, how does performance change over time in
the presence of a goal that must be attained by a dead-
line?
The fact that time is central to the motivational
effect of goals is not in question. Another motivated
behavior shown to arise from goals is persistence over
time (Locke and Latham 1990). Recent work has elab-
orated on this by modeling persistence as a factor that
reduces instability between intentions and actions
over time (Meier and Albrecht 2003). One early meta-
analysis (Tubbs 1986) found that goals specifying
quantity had a stronger effect (d = 0.845) than those
specifying a time by which the task was to be com-
pleted (d = 0.420), indicating that the goal-setting
effect is sensitive to the clock. Other work (Mitchell
et al. 2008, Vancouver et al. 2001, 2005) has examined
the dynamic nature of motivation and goal-striving
behavior. However, beyond the clear indication that
the motivational forces in play are dynamic, the func-
tional form of the relationships among goals, motiva-
tion, and performance over time, especially in the
presence of a deadline, is not well understood.
The d statistic is used as a measure of effect size
across studies in terms of the number of standard
deviations by which the mean impact is shifted. For
an intervention with d = 0.52, a task with expected
duration of 10 minutes and a standard deviation of
2 minutes would be expected to finish in 10  0.52(2)
= 8.96 minutes. This paper assumes a level of
improvement from goal setting and builds a perfor-
mance model and procedure from that assumption.
Then, it investigates the resulting performance
improvements, presuming the goal-setting interven-
tion works. After the primary results are presented,
sensitivity analysis is conducted on the size of the
goal-setting effect, including what would happen if
the intervention fails.
In addition to empirical work, there has been some
theoretical modeling of work rate changes over time,
which might be explained by a motivational dynamic.
For example, Graves (1986) modeled a work rate that
increased conjointly with workload, while Gutierrez
and Kouvelis (1991) modeled a work rate that
declined as the time to a deadline extended. These
models may be useful, but they do not rest on an
explanatory base; there is no empirical work that sup-
ports why work rates should change in the way these
models suggest. One exception to this is the work of
Schultz et al. (1998), which drew on substantial sup-
port from the Organizational Behavior literature on,
for example, interdependence to predict work rate
changes due to variance in buffers. The model this
paper presents is somewhat simpler, but more consis-
tent with the limited state of empirical work on the
dynamics of the goal-setting effect on motivation.
Goal difficulty is a variable that has received even
more attention than deadlines. One method of opera-
tionalization that is comparable across studies and
thus useful for meta-analysis is to use the frequency
of goal attainment as a measure of difficulty (Wright
1990, Wright et al. 1995). To our knowledge, there is
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no single prescribed number or equation for a “diffi-
cult” vs. an “easy” goal. For example, one article
referred to goals achieved 15% of the time or less as
“difficult” and a goal achieved 50% of the time or
more as “easy” (Klein et al. 1999), but prescriptions
for setting a “difficult” goal have been given as low as
10% attainment and as high as 25% attainment. None-
theless, it is clear that if a goal is perceived as “easy,”
it loses its motivational force, and if perceived as
unrealistically difficult, it is simply rejected and again
loses its motivational force (Erez and Zidon 1984).
Of course, what is easy or hard will itself be
affected by motivation, and this suggests the need for
a dynamic model in which changes in motivation and
goal difficulty interact. Such effects would be particu-
larly important to capture in the intermediate or long
term. Early work by Ivancevich (1972) suggested that
the motivational effects of a goal change over the long
term and might be maintained only if reinforced.
However, the dynamics remain under-investigated,
and our approach represents only a small step toward
addressing this issue.
The presence of a deadline adds another dimension
to the issue of goal difficulty. A task arriving closer to
a deadline will be more difficult to finish than one
arriving earlier. A precise level of attainment cannot
be applied to any given task—some tasks must neces-
sarily be harder than others, and tasks which start out
being “easy” may end up being “difficult.” One could
simply set a new goal for each task as it arrives. How-
ever, given the information processing burden of this
approach, setting a stationary goal based solely on
information available before the task arrives is the
preferable method. How to make such a goal motiva-
tional in aggregate for all the tasks is still an open
question.
In the context of our field setting, managers are
especially sensitive to time-based measures that relate
to customer service. In reviewing and evaluating the
metrics used by logistics managers, Caplice and Sheffi
(1994) said that a metric assessed the effectiveness of
a logistics operation when the metric compared out-
put with some normative standard. Of the 13 com-
mon effectiveness metrics they list, 8 used a time
period as the standard. The connection between the
timeliness of operations and customer service is well
understood in logistics and warehousing. Johnson
and Davis (1998) describe how Hewlett-Packard
tracks the timeliness of order fulfillment in logistics
operations by examining not only the average on-time
performance, but the entire distribution of order ful-
fillment times against their deadlines, or customer-
promised dates (which they call order aging profiles).
The NSD metric used in this paper is a time-based
effectiveness measure, closely related to order aging
profiles. The performance model presented in the
next section shows how a motivational goal on the
NSD metric can change performance. As such, it
begins to fill the gap between the findings of Goal-Set-
ting Theory and the operational metrics and policies
used to monitor and control order fulfillment opera-
tions.
3. Performance Model
In this section, a stochastic model of completion times
is developed for a randomly arriving task, when a
time-sensitive goal may motivate performance. This
model is required to evaluate the effect of a motiva-
tional goal on a deadline-sensitive task, when the task
may arrive early or finish late. In the next section, we
will embed this model in a Monte Carlo simulation to
evaluate potential cutoff times and nominal (percent-
to-complete) targets.
The model of behavioral effects presented here is
relatively simple because there is no empirical evi-
dence to guide the development of a more sophisti-
cated model. Nevertheless, our results suggest that a
motivational goal, coupled with appropriate parame-
ters for the NSD policy, can improve performance as
seen by the customer.
3.1. A Model of Completion Times with
Motivated Workers
Consider an order fulfillment operation with orders
arriving in a continuous stream throughout the day.
Workers prepare orders and make them available for
shipping (see Figure 1). Orders arrive in a work cycle
t. A work cycle has both a cutoff time and a targeted
shipment (truck departure) time. An order arriving
before a cutoff time is targeted for shipment on
the next truck scheduled to depart after that cutoff
time.
The processing time of an order is defined as the
time between its arrival and the time it is available for
shipping. Note that this definition of processing time
includes both operating time and waiting time in
queues. The essence of the model is that motivated
workers find ways to make orders available for ship-
ping more quickly. In a later section, simulation is
used to investigate the sensitivity of our model to this
assumption, to investigate the impact of queuing and
congestion.
Performance on the NSD metric depends on the
distribution of arrival times and processing times. It is
assumed that the firm has historical data on orders,
including arrival times and processing times for
“unmotivated workers,” or workers not responding
to NSD or some other motivational metric. The arrival
and processing time distributions convolve to deter-
mine a distribution (i.e., density function) of completion
times fc(x, y), where completion time of an order is the
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sum of its arrival time x and processing time y. Orders
arriving before a specified cutoff time ct each day are
batched and delivered to customers on a departing
vehicle. Assuming that there are no motivational







where dt is the target shipment time for the cycle
and ct is the cutoff time for jobs/arrivals counted
within a cycle. In other words, we are measuring
the probability that a random order (arriving
between two cutoff times) will finish by the deadline.
Because order arrival and processing times are inde-
pendent and identically distributed, the probability
that a randomly arriving order finishes before the
deadline can be used as a surrogate for the propor-
tion of all orders that finish. With this expression for
the unmotivated completion time distribution and
expected NSD performance, we can apply some of
the findings from Goal-Setting Theory to establish
the cutoff time.
Recall that a goal is said to motivate an employee
on a task in part through a mechanism that involves
attention. The goal directs attention to certain tasks at
the expense of others. Once attention is focused on
goal-relevant tasks, one can expect persistence and
effort to increase and reduce processing time. For
example, a task arriving after the cutoff but before the
previous deadline cannot be expected to receive the
same attention as the tasks that need to be completed
for the more proximal goal. Moreover, given random
arrivals across the deadline periods and a relatively
long processing time, there is a significant chance that
some tasks will not be finished by the deadline. In that
case, a new goal becomes relevant, and work on the
incomplete tasks can no longer help attain that new
goal.
This leads to the definition of a motivated window of
time [dt1, dt] for tasks that arrive in the interval [ct1,
ct]. A task that arrives between [ct1, dt1] will be
worked at an unmotivated rate until dt1, because the
task is not relevant to the most proximal goal. A task
that arrived before ct but is unfinished by dt will no
longer be worked at the motivated rate, because it is
no longer relevant for attaining the goal. Figure 2
shows the five possible combinations of motivated
and unmotivated task work rates.
The motivated rate itself can be expressed in terms
of the expected motivational effect of goal setting.
Recall from the previous section that this is expressed
in terms of the meta-analysis coefficient d, that is, as a
reduction in task time equivalent to d standard devia-





the expected motivated processing time will be
tm ¼ tu  drp;
where rp is the standard deviation of fp(y). The cor-
responding rates are
ru ¼ 1tu ; ð2Þ
t t t t
Tasks arriving in this time frame Are due by 
this deadline










Figure 2 Motivated Window
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and
rm ¼ 1tu  drp : ð3Þ
As rm increases, the processing time distribution
fp(y) will underestimate the probability that a task will
finish within a given time period and hence (1) is an
underestimate of NSD performance, given the pres-
ence of a motivated window.
Equations (2) and (3) can be used to develop for-
mulae for task completion time z for each of the five
cases shown in Figure 2. The expressions in Table 1
rely on the fact that the duration of motivated tasks
(or motivated portions of tasks) is proportionally (ru/
rm) less than the duration of unmotivated tasks, or
conversely, that (rm/ru) times more units of work can
be accomplished at the motivated rate. The expres-
sions for Case 1 and Case 4 follow directly from this
observation.
In Case 2, the motivated portion of the task starts at
dt1, so the portion of tu that is worked at the unmoti-
vated rate is dt1  x, where x is the arrival time. The
remainder of the task time is
tu  dt1  x;
which will be completed in (ru/rm)[tu  dt1  x]
time units.
In Case 5, the task arrives in the motivated window
but has not been finished by time dt so the remaining
work must be finished at the unmotivated rate. The
remaining work is
tu  fdt  xgðrm=ruÞ;
because in the time {dt  x}, work was accom-
plished at the motivated rate.
In Case 3, we have the combination of Cases 2 and
5: unmotivated work at the beginning and end of the
task. As in Case 2, the first unmotivated portion ends
at time dt1, and has finished (dt1  x) time units of
work. So, at dt1,
tu  dt1  x
time units of work remain. In this case, motivated
work will proceed for the entire cycle, accomplishing
ðrm=ruÞ½dt  dt1
units of work. Hence, the remaining work at time d
is
tu  ðdt1  xÞ  ðrm=ruÞ½dt  dt1:
Recall that the nominal target is stated by manage-
ment as a goal for NSD: the percentage of orders that
workers should attempt to place on the targeted
truck. Given a cutoff time ct, these expressions can be
used to predict motivated NSD performance Nm
against a nominal target p by using a Monte Carlo
simulation to integrate the cases across the joint distri-
bution of arrival times and unmotivated processing
times. But we have not yet dealt with the problem of
how to determine values for c or p.
4. A Goal-Setting Procedure
In the goal-setting literature, a motivational goal
needs to be difficult, which is usually defined in terms
of a, the frequency of goal attainment. A difficult goal
is one that has a relatively small chance of being
attained (e.g., a = 20%). However, having decided on
a level of goal attainment, there is still more than one
way to set p and c to create a policy that has the
desired level of difficulty. To see this, consider that a
given nominal goal p will be more easily attained by
moving the cutoff time ct backward in time. Con-
versely, a given ct can be made to correspond to a
relatively easier goal by lowering p. The relationships
among p, ct, and a are shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 3, a different distribution of Nm is shown
for different values of ct. On each of those distribu-
tions, p is the quantile associated with a performance
that is obtained only a% of the time. The distribution
of Nm is a function of the (motivated) distribution of
task completion times given in Table 1, and p is a
point on the distribution of Nm that requires estima-
tion. Note that the two example distributions drawn
there are merely notional––the true distributions are
not necessarily symmetric or identical (and the field-
site data are neither). Whether or not the distributions
are symmetric or identical, generally a will be a
Table 1 A Model of Motivated Task Completion Times Against a Deadline (Time Measured in Days, Setting Previous Cutoff Time = (c  1) = 0)
Case Arrival time condition Processing time condition Completion time
1 ct1 < x < dt1 tu < {dt-1  x} z = x + tu








4 dt1 < x < ct tu (
r u
rm
) < dt  x z = x + tu (r urm)
5 dt1 < x < ct tu (
r u
rm
) > dt  x z = dt + (tu  [{dt  x} (rmr u )])
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different point on each distribution that corresponds
to a nominal goal that achieves the desired level of
goal difficulty. Because the Central Limit Theorem
does not apply to quantile estimates on these distribu-
tions, a procedure such as bootstrapping (Efron and
Tibshirani 1998) must be used to provide robust esti-
mates of p. (Note that this bootstrapping procedure
would not be needed if the task-completion time distri-
butions could be fit to a simple analytical distribution.
However, because we are estimating the distribution
from empirical arrival and processing time distributions,
it is necessary.)
Goal-setting theory prescribes not only a level for a,
but a level for ct as well. In Figure 2, for example, the
motivational window is maximized when dt  ct is as
small as possible. To make dt  ct as small as possible,
one should make ct as late as possible, then one can
use Monte Carlo simulation with Equation (1) and
the equations in Table 1 to set p to the nominal goal,
which can be achieved a% of the time. Because it pro-
vides a motivational goal over the largest motiva-
tional window, this set of policy parameters should
yield the highest customer service.
In practice, an upper bound on ct might be deter-
mined by three factors. First, one must worry about
goal rejection. For example, if average processing time
is 12 hours, a cutoff time set to 1 hour before depar-
ture is likely to be rejected as unrealistic. We are un-
aware of any goal-setting research to guide the setting
of a bound to guarantee goal acceptance. The implica-
tions of this will be examined below. Second, the mag-
nitude of the nominal goal may become so low that it
lacks face validity as a stretch goal for the workers.
For example, telling a worker that he must “strive to
ship 30%” of the available orders on the next sched-
uled departure is unlikely to be perceived as a diffi-
cult goal, and workers’ failure to achieve such a
seemingly modest goal more than 20% of the time is
likely instead to be de-motivational. Finally, if a cutoff
time is published to the customers, customer service
concerns will dictate an earlier cutoff time. In our pro-
cedure, we do not bound c, but allow it to be as late as
one increment (1 hour) before the truck departure.
An arbitrary constraint might be added to our proce-
dure, to ensure a minimum time period between the
cutoff time and truck departure. We will examine the
practical implications of so bounding the cutoff time
in the next section.
5. Application and Analysis
In this section, data from the field site previously men-
tioned are used to demonstrate the procedure used to
set goal parameters. Using the tenets of Goal-Setting
Theory, a is set to a “difficult goal” level, and ct is
made as late as possible to maximize the size of the
motivated window. Given these values for a and ct, a
Monte Carlo simulation and bootstrapping procedure
are used to estimate p and to calculate the expected
performance of the policy. Next, our results are com-
pared to a policy that management found intuitively
appealing, and the superiority of our approach on
these data is demonstrated. Then, a sensitivity analy-
sis is conducted to assess the effect of setting an upper
bound on cutoff time or a lower bound on the magni-
tude of the nominal goal. Finally, discrete-event simu-
lation is used to investigate the impact of congestion
effects on our results and to investigate the sensitivity
of our results to changes in effect size.
5.1. Applying the Policy
To apply the policy, we must assume a particular
value for the goal-setting effect. For our numerical
analysis, two moderators of this effect are particularly
relevant. One is the difference between field applica-
tions and lab studies, with meta-analyses of field
applications typically reporting smaller effect sizes.
For example, Mento et al. (1987) reported an effect
















Cutoff Time, t -- Hours Before Departure
NSD NSD Average
Nominal Goal, 
Figure 3 Relationships among c, p, and a
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size of d = 0.439 in field studies, but d = 0.624 in lab
studies. Likewise, Tubbs (1986) reported an effect size
of d = 0.520 in the field, but 0.897 in the lab. Another
moderator that is important to us is task complexity,
with simpler tasks showing a stronger effect in meta-
analyses. For example, Wood et al. (1987) report
performance improvements of 12.15% (d = 0.76) on
simpler tasks, but only 7.8% on more complex tasks.
In the present study, an effect size of d = 0.52 is
assumed as a realistic but conservative estimate, rec-
ognizing that the exact effect will vary from setting to
setting. The paper will later examine other effect sizes
(including no effect) in a post hoc analysis.
The sample data consisted of the 9,133 observations
of arrival and processing times from 1 month for a
single transportation provider, an average of 295
orders/day. The site had several providers, as well as
its own fleet of transportation assets. The shipments
we chose to track had a reliable daily shipment sche-
dule, provided by a well-known third-party logistics
provider. Mean processing time was 16.48 hours,
with a standard deviation of 10.07 hours. Both the
processing time and arrival time distributions were
skewed and multi-modal. No analytical distribution
could be found to provide an adequate fit to either, so
we chose to use the empirical distributions in our sim-
ulation.
To maximize the size of the motivated window,
the cutoff time was set to 1 hour before the deadline.
A Monte Carlo simulation and the equations in
Table 1 were then used to derive a finish time distri-
bution for each task, accounting for motivation
effects. We simulated 300 tasks for each deadline,
roughly the average number of tasks per day at our
site, and calculated the percentage of tasks that
finished by the deadline, Nm. Each run of this simula-
tion provides us with a single point on a sample dis-
tribution of Nm for that cutoff time. The simulation
was then repeated 100 times, yielding a sampling dis-
tribution of 100 observations of performance for each
cutoff time. The CDF of this distribution is U^cðNmÞ,
and p = Nm ∈ U^cðNmÞ = a, that is,
U^1c ðaÞ ¼ p: ð4Þ
We set a = 0.2, and so find U^11 ð0:2Þ ¼ p:
Note that U^cðNmÞ is the sampling distribution of a
point estimate, the percentile associated with the
number of tasks completed by the deadline. To assess
the quality (confidence) of our estimate, a bootstrap
analysis was conducted on our Monte Carlo simula-
tion results, resampling U^cðNmÞ 500 times to get
acceptably low variance in the estimate (Efron and
Tibshirani 1998, p. 275). A 90% confidence interval is
shown in Figure 4, which indicates that the nominal
goal should be set to 68%. Importantly, Figure 4 also
shows that, on these data at least, the procedure is rel-
atively insensitive (robust) to the particular value
selected for a. This is desirable because there is no
precise guidance on the best value for a.
5.2. Performance Comparisons
To assess the quality of the policy derived on these
data (a = 0.2, ct = 1 hour before departure, p = 0.68),
it is next compared with two heuristic policies pro-
posed by managers at the industry site. To make this
comparison, there must be a common yardstick, sepa-
rate from NSD, against which to compare the policies.
As one varies cutoff time and nominal goal, NSD
has different meanings––comparing a policy of
ct = 23 hours before departure, p = 50% (that is, up to
23 hours to get 50% of the tasks finished) with a pol-
icy of ct = 1 hour before departure, p = 90% (that is,
as little as 1 hour to get 90% of the tasks finished) in
terms of percent of tasks finished by the deadline is
not a fair comparison. This problem was solved by
measuring the percentage of tasks that were finished
by the deadline immediately following arrival, regard-
less of whether that deadline was targeted for the task.
This measure is related to the order aging profile met-
ric mentioned in Johnson and Davis (1998) and can be
called “tasks finished without delay.” The percentage
of tasks finished without delay under our policy was
61.3%.
Management at our field site intuitively felt that
the nominal goal p should be some high number,
such as 80%, to be motivational. They proposed a
policy (A) to use fp(y) to determine the processing
time required by at least 80% of the tasks and to set
the cutoff time back from the deadline by that many
hours––in this case, 21 hours before the deadline.
Setting values for p and ct, of course, determines a
value for a. One might think that this would yield an
“easy” goal that would be attained about 50% of the
time, but that is not necessarily the case, because
10% 15% 20% 25%








Figure 4 Ninety Percent Confidence Intervals for the Nominal Goal,
with Cutoff Time 1 Hour before Departure, across Values of
Goal Attainment from 0.10 to 0.25
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setting the parameters in this way ignores the effect
of the arrival time distribution. However, when we
simulated this policy with 300 tasks over 100 dead-
lines, we found that the nominal goal was indeed
attained 100% of the time (even without a motiva-
tional effect to reduce processing times). The mini-
mum percentage of tasks completed by the deadline
was 88.67% and the maximum was 95.67%. How-
ever, percentage of tasks finished without delay was
only 41.1%, primarily due to the fact that this easy
goal was not motivational.
The failure of policy A suggests policy B: set a nom-
inal goal of 80%, but then use Equation (4) to search
over cutoff times until one finds a cutoff time that
yields a difficult nominal goal of 80%. While this pro-
cedure is less intuitive, it still relies on the model
developed in this paper. Policy B can be stated as
ctU^
1
c ð0:2Þ ¼ 0:8: ð5Þ
Figure 5 illustrates the result of this search. In
Figure 5, the dashed line shows the nominal goal at
each cutoff time, while the solid line displays the per-
centage of orders finished without delay––our com-
mon yardstick performance measure. The cutoff time
most nearly associated with a difficult goal of 80% is
10 hours before departure. The percent of tasks fin-
ished without delay under this policy is only 58.2%,
slightly worse than the 61.3% obtained by our policy.
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the best policy is one that
maximizes the size of the motivational window by
setting the cutoff time as late as is practical.
In spite of the implications of Figure 5, there may
still be practical reasons to use Policy B, or a policy
that bounds cutoff time rather than the nominal goal.
These will be discussed in the next section. The results
show that the price of establishing a “floor” such as
80% on the nominal goal percentage or a ceiling on
cutoff time such as 10 hours before departure time
may be quite low, so long as the proper goal-setting
procedure is used.
5.3. Sensitivity Analysis and Effect of Congestion
Before addressing the managerial implications of the
model, consider two ancillary issues—the sensitivity
of our results to changes in effect size (d) and the
effect of congestion. The goal-setting effect size used
in the main analysis was d = 0.52. Again, the results
assume this goal-setting improvement and build a per-
formance model from it. Based on that performance
model, a procedure for setting the cutoff time and
nominal goal was proposed consistent with the tenets
of Goal-Setting Theory. However, goal-setting inter-
ventions do not always work. And while d = 0.52 may
be a fair representation of the average effect size to be
expected in a field implementation with simple tasks,
the effect size in any particular setting can be more or
less. To address this issue, a discrete-event simulation
was developed to examine effect sizes across a range
from 0.0 (failed implementation) to d = 0.75 (a conser-
vative “maximum” that might occur in a field imple-
mentation). We assumed a simple, single-server
queuing system with exponential processing and
interarrival times, adjusted to achieve a utilization of
approximately 85 percent. The cutoff time was held
constant at 4 hours before truck departure.
For effect size d = 0 (no motivation), average NSD
was 84.2 percent. The simulation was repeated for
effect sizes d = 0.1, 0.25, 0.52, and 0.75. Average NSD
was 92.8, 95.8, 99.2, and 99.9 percent, respectively. As
expected, performance is improved, even for quite
modest effect sizes, so long as the goal-setting inter-
vention does not actually fail. Incidentally, one might
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Figure 5 Next Scheduled Deadline (NSD) Performance Across Cutoff Times
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compared to the flow time metric even without the
motivational effect, because workers will no longer be
working overtime on Friday to put boxes on the dock
to be shipped Monday afternoon. However, these
effects are not captured in the simulation.
The performance model ignores the effects of con-
gestion, which may seem curious to those familiar
with outbound operations in a warehouse. Because
our goal is set in terms of when work is started rather
than when an order arrives, the primary effect of con-
gestion will not be on motivation. At the field site,
orders were not released to workers until they were
ready to start them. If workers can see the work
“build up,” congestion may have motivational effects
as well (Schultz et al. 1998, 1999). However, in peri-
ods of high utilization, there will be a delay in starting
work, and hence, the percentage of tasks finished with-
out delay will be reduced as utilization increases. To
demonstrate this, a discrete event simulation was
coded and average utilization was varied from 55% to
98%. Results are shown in Table 2. The percent reduc-
tion in task times is related to the goal effect size d. As
is shown, congestion has relatively little effect on
motivation. In heavy traffic, however, our model’s
predictions for tasks finished without delay are signif-
icantly overstated. The prescription remains the same,
regardless of utilization: set cutoff times as late as
practical, but heavy traffic will reduce the perfor-
mance impact of the motivational goal.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Goal acceptance and commitment have previously
been investigated as moderators (Klein et al. 1999,
Ronan et al. 1973), but beyond the general result that
goals can be too difficult, there is little specific enough
to build a model upon. The assumed bound on cutoff
time (at least 1 hour before the departure) is recogni-
tion of the importance of goal acceptance, which
requires little in the way of additional assumptions.
More sophisticated approaches are possible, even
given the limited data available about precisely when
goals will be rejected. For example, another approach
to bounding the cutoff time would be to examine the
processing time distribution to find the minimum
time required by at least 20% of the orders. In the field
data, this was 8.1 hours. Setting the cutoff time at
least 8 hours before the goal ought to give employees
at least a 20% chance to finish any task that arrived
before the cutoff time. As 20% has been shown to
yield a difficult goal that is not rejected, this should
provide an acceptable upper bound. As Figure 5 indi-
cates, a cutoff time 8 hours before the deadline yields
only a very small degradation in performance on our
field data (tasks finished without delay drops to 59.8
from 61.3). Ultimately, however, there is no guarantee
that any goal will be accepted. Good scales exist, and
goal acceptance is best addressed by measuring it.
A more difficult question is whether or not to pub-
lish cutoff times to customers. This is done in some
distribution businesses, for example, when customers
are told that they will receive their order the next day
if they place it the previous day by 14:00. In such cases,
what is purely a nominal goal in our model becomes
the percentage of time a customer-promise date is
fulfilled, and consequently values of p as low as 68%
are unacceptable. On the other hand, cutoff times set
too early will not provide any marketing advantage
(customers are likely to be unimpressed if told that
their order will arrive the next day, so long as they
order by 1:00 a.m. on the previous day). The develop-
ment of a model to capture these customer service
costs is beyond the scope of the current paper, but Fig-
ure 5 makes some of the trade-offs plain. On the data
from the field site, there is very little reason to move
the cutoff time earlier than 16 hours before the dead-
line, where the nominal goal is 97% and the percent-
age of tasks finished with delay is 46.5%. Cutoff times
set any earlier yield minimal improvements in the
nominal goal at a large expense in the percentage of
tasks finished without delay (down to 41.9%), as well
as the size of the motivational window and the “mar-
keting opportunity” of a late cutoff time. On the other
hand, after ct = 12 hours before the deadline, the nom-
inal goal drops off quite rapidly, moving from 92%
down to 73% only 3 hours later. Setting ct to between
16 and 12 hours before the cutoff, the choice of a cutoff
time would depend on the relative marketing value of
the later cutoff time, against the cost of lowered deliv-
ery-as-promised from 97% to 92%. These times are
wholly a function of the particular arrival and process-
ing time distributions at our field site. However, given
other arrival and processing time distributions, the
procedure will still yield appropriate (motivational)
nominal goals for each cutoff time, so that manage-
ment can make a better informed decision about
setting and publishing the cutoff time.







% of tasks finished
without delay
55 24.3 0.0002 53.3
65 24.3 0.0033 53.4
75 24.2 0.0370 53.2
85 24.0 0.3463 51.9
95 22.0 6.7996 30.0
98 21.2 25.1800 17.9
Note that the percentage tasks finished without delay do not match the
numbers reported in Figure 5 because analytical distributions were used,
rather than the empirical distributions used in Figure 5. We cross-
validated the results shown here by applying the analytical distributions
back into the model shown in Table 1.
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A simpler method might simply be to establish two
cutoff times—there is no reason why the cutoff time
given to motivate employees must be the same as the
cutoff time published to customers. The intent of each
is different. The cutoff time would have to be set early
enough to get nearly all the orders that arrive before
the customer-published cutoff time on the next ship-
ment (i.e., the customer-published cutoff time should
yield an “easy” and hence non-motivational goal).
The manager of an order fulfillment operation may
object that there is nothing easy about meeting cus-
tomer expectations for nearly perfect on-time deliv-
ery. Partly this is just confusion raised because of the
way the word “easy” has been defined in the goal-set-
ting literature—it is not “easy” to meet any perfor-
mance target consistently and reliably.
Finally, the NSD metric allows executives of large
distribution firms with multiple, disparate distribu-
tion centers to compare service performance fairly.
Because NSD can be “tuned” with the cutoff time,
executives can establish base cutoff times that corre-
spond to the same nominal goal for all DCs, thereby
establishing a common yardstick for performance. DC
managers at our field site occasionally complained
that measures used to judge their performance
against other DCs were, necessarily, “apples and
oranges.” NSD provides a way to move toward
“apples and apples.”
6.1. Limitations
Before summarizing the contributions of this research,
we review its limitations. The first concerns the exter-
nal validity or generalizability of the results. The find-
ings reported here are based on a simulation model of
the process in question and not on experimentation
with the process itself. Although the use of simulation
models to investigate behavioral phenomenon is
becoming increasingly common and more widely
accepted (e.g., Vancouver et al. 2005), such research
will always need further cross-validation from field
and laboratory work. The field data, the particular
values of the parameters derived (i.e., p and ct), as
well as the performance improvement reported all
come from a unique setting. A particular concern is
that the coefficient of variation (CV) in the processing
times examined is unusually high (0.61) compared to
typical ranges of CV found with unpaced tasks (Doerr
and Arreola-Risa 2000, Knott and Sury 1987, Muth
1973). For example, Doerr et al. (2000) characterize
“high variability” unpaced tasks as those in the range
of 0.22–0.57. Because the magnitude of the goal-set-
ting effect depends on the relative magnitude of the
standard deviation to the mean (i.e., the CV), the mag-
nitude of the performance improvement reported
here may be greater than that which would be found
in other field settings. However, having demonstrated
that the performance model and bootstrapping proce-
dure is robust enough to yield good results with these
unusual distributions, there is no reason to suppose
that they could not be even more easily applied to a
situation where tasks and arrivals followed a more
predictable pattern.
Another limitation is that the procedure assumes
that the goal intervention will succeed, but that is not
always the case. Still, goal-setting interventions are
widely prescribed and widely successful: the effect
sizes reported here are average effect sizes from meta-
analytic studies. Sensitivity analysis on effect size has
shown that significant performance improvement is
obtainable with quite modest effect sizes. Figure 4
provides a limited sensitivity analysis on a, showing
that the procedure is robust across reasonable inter-
pretations of a “difficult goal.” This provides partial
evidence that the bootstrapping procedure (Equation
4) will provide a motivational goal, regardless of the
exact value of a, so long as a is chosen to be a level
that is neither too easy nor too hard. We recognize the
limitations of these assumptions, but if the empirical
results of goal-setting research are ever to be applied
in modeling work, similar assumptions will have to
be made, and we are not aware of any more rigorous
procedure to select a value for d or a.
Third, the basic performance model ignores conges-
tion effects. As the sensitivity analysis shows, the pri-
mary impact of queuing delay is not on motivation.
However, when utilization is high, significant order
delays will occur, and the basic model will be optimis-
tic in terms of the expected number of tasks finished
without delay.
Finally, although the performance model is a fair
representation of the current state of goal-setting
effects in a dynamic environment, better models are
needed for both near- and intermediate-term policy
making. In the intermediate term, the feedback loop
implied by the goal setting–motivation interaction
needs to be modeled explicitly. The “motivational
windows” defined here are only a first-stage approx-
imation to this interaction, for which a system-dynamic
model might be developed. In the near term as well,
our policy does not use the sorts of information tech-
nology available today to modify goals based on
information about orders and operations. There is,
however, currently no clear guidance on what to do
with such information in terms of setting goals.
Important extensions to Goal-Setting Theory are
needed to investigate exactly how motivation shifts
over time in the near term, especially as a deadline
approaches. The model in this paper, in which
motivation is either present or absent depending
on the current time in relation to the targeted
deadline, could be enhanced were such information
available.
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6.2. Summary and Conclusions
For order fulfillment systems with deadlines, a sen-
sible performance metric for customer service must
incorporate the linkage between upstream continu-
ous processes and downstream batch processes. The
NSD metric does just this, and in a way that allows
managers to adjust to any order arrival or process-
ing time distribution. When published to workers
along with a properly established goal, the metric
encourages motivated behaviors such as increased
work rates and improved task strategies. This moti-
vation in turn improves customer service by causing
more customers to receive their orders sooner. An
important feature of the metric is that, for a given
cutoff time, an increase in its recorded value neces-
sarily means an improvement in real customer ser-
vice, which in this case is reduced customer waiting
time.
The procedure takes as input the distributions of
task arrival and processing times. Using principles
from Goal-Setting Theory, a performance model
(Table 1) is developed to set a cutoff time between
deadlines. Tasks arriving after the cutoff time are not
targeted for the immediately following deadline, but
for the subsequent one. To set a motivational goal for
each deadline, principles from Goal-Setting Theory
are again applied to determine a desired level of diffi-
culty, then a bootstrapping procedure is applied to
estimate a nominal goal corresponding to that level of
difficulty for the given cutoff time.
The policy resulting from the procedure is com-
pared with an intuitive policy, using the percentage
of tasks finished without delay as a criterion. The pro-
cedure was demonstrated to be superior on these
data. Under the procedure, 61.3% of tasks were fin-
ished without delay, compared to 41.1% under the
intuitive policy. Also investigated was the penalty
that would be paid if management established a floor
on the nominal goal or a ceiling on the cutoff time.
Monte Carlo simulation results suggested that this
penalty might be as low as 3.1% (58.2% of tasks fin-
ished without delay, as opposed to 61.3%).
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